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Managing the Change of Cultural Resistance 
David B. Smith 
 
Abstract:  The review of numerous Australian and International Transport and 
Health Safety cases has highlighted the detrimental effect of cultural resistance 
when engineers and regulators seek to improve transport safety. 
 
This paper will define culture and cultural resistance.   It will review a number of 
cases and provide an overview of the effect of cultural resistance, 
demonstrating some common characteristics of these cases. 
 
A limited number of risk management disciplines will be reviewed as they apply 
to the problem, and demonstrate how expertise in these fields can be 
advantageous to the engineer and regulator. 
 
The paper will provide the reader with a number of resolution strategies to 
manage cultural change by reducing resistance using practical methods.   This 
paper has specific relevance to transport safety initiatives in Australia. 
 
This paper is an extract of a full research paper “Making the Kingfisher 
Archipelago a Safer Place”, Smith, D.B., 2005, available from the author upon 
request. 
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Introduction 
 
 
On January 31, 2003, seven people were killed when their Port Kembla-bound train left 
the rails and overturned at Waterfall, an outer Sydney suburb, following the 
incapacitation of the driver.   Despite the State Rail Authority being armed for many 
years with the knowledge of a deficient safety system, a culture existed that enabled 
safety violations to occur. 
 
Cultural resistance regularly and consistently reduces the effective introduction of 
transport safety initiatives all over our country, and so costs lives. 
 
It is often considered that the public, whom regulators and engineers seek to protect, 
frustrate genuine efforts to improve public safety due to cultural understandings and 
misgivings, individual thoughts and perceptions, and group interests.  
 
 
What is cultural resistance? 
 
 
In order to define cultural resistance in a transport safety context, it is first necessary to 
define culture in terms of transport safety, and also to consider resistance in its 
application to transport safety. 
 
 
Defining Culture: 
 
 
Many people think of culture as “national culture” which incorporates the idiosyncrasies 
of a particular race or tribe of people, traditions and methodology that has been handed 
down from generation to generation.    
 
Culture is defined more broadly than simply national culture, although national culture 
cannot be eliminated from the definition, a fact that will become apparent. Culture is 
made up of a group of people and contains values that the group has made important, 
whether by conscious decision or otherwise.   One clarifying point is that national 
culture may develop certain values of interest to this study, but the fact that it is part of 
a national culture is incidental.    
 
Anthropologists have studied culture for centuries, so there are no new concepts about 
culture in this study.   In fact, Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952) in Louis (1985) identified 
164 different meanings of the term “culture”! 
 
Culture is evident in our society at different levels.  Some practical applications of 
culture include general cultural values that in western society we take for granted: 
democratic political processes, freedom of speech and the right to a fair trial.   More 
specific cultural values may be the importance that mountain cattlemen place on the 
privilege of managing leasehold in the alpine regions, or environmental groups place 
on protection of marine species in the Great Barrier Reef.   Within each culture, there 
are a number of specific factors referred to as “values” which are important to the 
operation of that culture. 
 
Webster’s Dictionary defines culture as a complex of typical behaviour or standardised 
social characteristics peculiar to a specific group, occupation or profession, sex, age 
grade or social class (Gove, 1976). 
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Culture will be defined for the purpose of this discussion as “values unique to a 
particular interest group”. 
 
A safety culture can be developed by: 
(a) A group of individuals coming together because they share similar values regarding 
safety; or  
(b) By a management group developing and promoting values, and enforcing safety 
rules and regulations.    
 
In cases of interest groups, common value sharing is likely to be the factor that draws 
individuals together. In the case of industry, the latter is more likely to occur; that is, 
employees become a part of a group that already has a set of safety values, whilst 
there may be no prerequisite for the individual to have a previous affiliation with those 
values. 
 
 
 
Safety Culture  
 
 
A safety culture consists of the individuals participating as part of a group and being 
guided in their behaviour by jointly held beliefs about the importance of safety … which 
every member of the organisation believes in and is prepared to support other 
members of the organisation in trying to achieve the result … (McInerney 2005, p.215) 
 
Ideologically, a safety culture is a team effort with all team members sharing similar 
values regarding safety, and working together to ensure that those values are 
maintained without damage or deterioration. 
 
 
Safety Climate 
 
 
In a variation of his previous definition, McInerney includes as safety culture the 
understanding of people’s fundamental values with respect to, among other things, risk 
and safety, whereas safety climate is an observable part of the safety culture.   In other 
words, the safety climate is the outworking of the culture.   Ideologically, the safety 
climate and safety culture should differ little, but experience shows otherwise: 
 
On January 31, 2003, a passenger train left the rails at high speed and crashed in 
Sydney’s outer suburban Waterfall.   The train driver and six passengers were killed, 
and a subsequent Special Commission of Enquiry revealed that within RailCorp 
(previously State Rail Authority of New South Wales), a deficient safety culture existed 
prior to the Waterfall tragedy.    
 
The executive summary of The Honourable Peter McInerney is damning of the 
deficient safety culture that was allowed to develop and remain an active ingredient in 
this crash.   In a summary of the safety culture, he asserts that 10 major factors 
contributed to a deficient safety culture.   Some of those factors included a reluctance 
to address known safety problems, bullying and failure to learn from previous 
accidents. 
 
The results of a safety climate survey indicated that as an overall average, the safety 
climate perception by a wide range of RailCorp employees and management was just 
above neutral (McInerney, 2005).   The result shows that the safety culture and the 
safety climate were not alike. 
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The following points demonstrate reluctance in RailCorp to change: 
 
• A rail crash at Kerrabee in New South Wales on August 18, 1998 had 
contributing elements of communication breakdown; 
• A rail crash at Glenbrook on December 2, 1999 killed 6 people and injured 100.   
Communication failures were similar to those that occurred in the Kerrabee 
crash; 
• The circumstances of the Glenbrook crash were the subject of a Special 
Commission of Inquiry which made 95 recommendations, including a number of 
core recommendations; 
• Communication failures contributed to yet another crash, this time at Hexham in 
New South Wales in which 9 people were injured; (McInerney, 2005) 
• Following the Hexham rail crash there was then another at Bargo, followed by a 
series of serious rail accidents at Matakana, Bargo, Galong, Cockle Creek 
(NSW Legislative Assembly, 2004); 
• The core recommendations of the Glenbrook Special Commission of Inquiry 
final report were not implemented (McInerney, 2005 pp. 51-52); 
• Following the Waterfall crash, an emergency response exercise was conducted 
under the name Exercise Wombat.   Even though Exercise Wombat identified a 
number of deficiencies, those deficiencies were apparently not acted upon 
(McInerney, 2005). 
 
The crash at Waterfall in light of the preceding tragedies, especially the Glenbrook 
crash is significant in the respect that it is overt evidence of the existence of a culture 
resistant to safety improvement.    
 
 
Measuring Safety Cultures and Climates: 
 
 
Dr. Edkins (McInerney 2005, p.224) states that safety climate is easier to measure than 
safety culture, as it has tangible components. 
 
Whilst anthropologists have considered culture for hundreds of years, there is no 
proven method for quantitatively measuring culture.   Cultural values have been 
identified in various studies, (for example Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read and 
Combs, 2001).   Previous studies have produced limited lists of cultural values, but no 
studies have produced an exhaustive list of values seen in cultures worldwide.   No 
previous studies have viewed cultural values in the transport safety sphere at all. 
 
It is feasible that further research may enable measurement of a quantitative safety 
culture system and the development of such a system is a focus of this research as it 
contributes to a transport safety management strategy. 
 
 
Defining Cultural Resistance 
 
 
Cultural values dictate the amount of resistance created by a group and shape the 
motivation for sustaining resistance to an initiative.   Resistance to transport safety 
initiatives takes one of two forms: it either produces intentional results or unintentional 
results.   Resistance is always intentional, but the outcome is not necessarily the 
intended outcome. 
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Example of resistance producing intended results:   Drink Driving Legislation in Victoria 
 
 
Figures first compiled and presented around 1958 by the Victorian Police Surgeon, Dr. 
John Birrell showed that alcohol was a significant contributor to road deaths.   A 
subsequent suggestion for drink-driving legislation was met with fierce opposition from 
civil liberties groups and at least one Melbourne brewery.   According to Birrell, the 
brewery even produced a pamphlet denying the statistics that had been presented. 
 
The Royal Automobile Club of Victoria (RACV) was also opposed to the introduction of 
drink driving legislation. (It is important to note that the RACV has changed 
membership and management many times since the late 1950s, and any negative 
comments about that organisation as it operated at that time should not be seen to be 
painting a picture of the organisation today.) 
 
Media articles and derogatory comments from the judiciary were amongst the 
resistance generated and displayed by the community.   This resistance was 
commensurate with resistance from the general population and demonstrates the effect 
of cultural resistance.    
 
The cultural resistance delayed the progress of Victoria drink driving legislation by 
several years.   The result of the resistance (delay) was intentional. 
 
 
Example of Resistance Producing Unintended Results: Space Shuttle Challenger 
 
 
 
On the evening of January 27, 1986, during a teleconference between NASA officials 
and contract engineers, individuals expressed serious concerns about the Space 
Shuttle Challenger launch scheduled for the following day.   There were extremely cold 
temperatures forecast, and the o-rings in the solid rocket boosters were known to be 
prone to failure in such conditions.   Engineers advised against launch.    
 
The pressure from NASA management was so great that even the engineer who was 
most opposed to launch relented and voted in favour of the launch to proceed.   The 
resistance to delaying the launch schedule had an impact upon very experienced and 
decisive space program managers. 
 
A little over 15 hours later, seven astronauts perished when their space vehicle erupted 
into flames. 
 
Source: Vaughan, 1996 
 
NASA officials did not generate resistance with the intention of causing the failure of 
the mission or harm to the astronauts.   The result of the resistance was unintended. 
 
 
Why is Change Needed? 
 
 
The values of a culture have significant effect on risk management specifically in the 
area of risk perception. 
 
Ritchie and Marshall (1993) demonstrate very simply the influences that may impact an 
individual’s thoughts:  friends, peers, subordinates, managers, consultants, customers, 
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competitors, outside influences and others.   It is pertinent to add family, personal 
experience and lifestyle to that list. 
 
Individuals and groups who are directly responsible for risk management as it applies 
to transport safety include regulators, legislators and organisations.    
 
Individuals and groups who are indirectly responsible for risk management as it applies 
to transport safety include consumers, transport users, manufacturers, special interest 
groups and the public at large.    
 
When safety initiatives are to be introduced to transport safety, the responsible groups 
often find significant resistance to the process. 
 
 
Wire Rope Barriers 
 
 
In Victoria, the single highest fatal crash type for all vehicle types is a single vehicle into 
an object.   The most effective engineering fix has proved to be wire rope barriers.   
These barriers are being installed on Victoria road systems at high accident locations 
to prevent single vehicles striking objects.   The wire rope project has been ongoing for 
several years and formed a formal part of the VicRoads agenda.   Prior to 
implementation in Victoria, a wire rope program in Sweden proved very successful in 
the reduction of crashes (Johnson, 2005). 
 
During the course of the Victorian project, significant opposition was encountered from 
the motorcycle lobby and the project suspended or protracted in certain locations.   
Recently VicRoads has overcome the resistance and recommenced the project. 
 
A high road toll and significant statistics of single-vehicle-into-object fatal crashes on 
Victorian Roads caused VicRoads to investigate safety initiatives in order to improve 
road safety for Victorian road users.   Subsequent implementation of the wire rope 
project saw resistance from the motorcycle lobby, which perceived that the wire rope 
project would increase the risk to motorcycle riders. 
 
A wire rope barrier is also known as a wire rope safety fence.   Wire rope barriers are 
being used throughout the world to separate vehicles travelling in opposing direction.    
 
Wire rope barriers are flexible road barrier systems which effectively prevent vehicles 
crossing the barrier by use of wire ropes stretched across the entire longitudinal section 
of the barrier, held in tension and suspended from closely erected plastic posts.   Wire 
rope barriers are flexible barriers that cause the least damage to vehicles and the 
smallest risk of injury to vehicle occupants when compared with other barrier types.    
 
Whilst statistically in Victoria the single highest fatal crash type is single vehicle into an 
object, Alway and Poznanski’s study shows that single vehicle into an object for 
motorcycles is the lowest fatal and serious injury crash type in Victoria.  Despite 
these statistics, opposition to the construction of wire rope barriers has been almost 
exclusively from the motorcycle lobby. 
 
The Motorcycle Rider’s Association (MRA) is the main voice of the motorcycle lobby in 
Victoria.   Despite the fact that motorcycle-into-object crashes are at a low rate, the 
MRA has been effectively campaigning against the installation of the wire rope barriers.   
Numerous MRA publications show the extensive campaign waged by the motorcycle 
lobby.   For example, see the Motorcycle Riders Association of Australia National 
Campaign Against Wire Rope Barriers Launched.  
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Following significant slowing of the program due to resistance from minority groups 
including MRA, VicRoads has recently reintroduced the installation program with the 
exception of installation on the most prevalent leisure motorcycling routes such as the 
Black Spur and the Great Ocean Road.   VicRoads has taken a community 
consultation approach to this issue and has localised the project.   Regardless of the 
evidence for the exclusion of certain motorcycle routes, stakeholders have reached an 
outcome that for the time being appears to be satisfactory for all. 
 
 
Measuring Cultural Resistance 
 
 
Just as a road accident investigator is able to measure the resistance of a road surface 
by calculating the co-efficient of friction, and an aeronautical engineer is able to 
measure the co-efficient of friction of a wing, measurement of cultural resistance would 
be extremely helpful, particularly as a planning tool. 
 
Before measuring cultural resistance, one must first measure the culture that is 
generating the resistance.   Whilst the effect of culture may be measurable by the harm 
it causes, it is not as easy to measure the culture itself in the sense of assigning a 
value to it, nor is there currently a method to do so. 
 
Remembering that culture has been defined simply as “values unique to a particular 
interest group”, it is possible to comprehensively identify and list those values, take the 
values so determined and to apply a measure to each of those values to enable the 
culture to be measured quantitatively.    
 
Fischhoff et al have already conducted a comprehensive study, which involved the 
identification and recording of a range of cultural values including activities and 
technological “tools”.   Whilst Fischhoff et al undertook the study for a different reason 
being proposed here, the list compiled by them (Fischoff et al 2001, p.84) serves to 
illustrate the possibility of listing cultural values, although their list is somewhat limited. 
 
Having measured the culture, a similar method could be developed by which cultural 
resistance could be quantitatively measured.   As well as the cultural values, other 
factors to consider in the measurement of cultural resistance may include the historical 
evidence of safety initiative processes and the resistance history of particular cultures 
that share values, that is, common value resistance. 
 
 
Theories and Principles Involved in the Change 
 
 
Some established theories relevant to managing the change of cultural resistance 
include the Normalisation of Deviance Theory (Vaughan 1996, Hopkins 1999 and 
Windridge 1996), Social Construction of Risk (Slovic, 2000), Expected Utility Theory 
(original source unknown) and Cumulative Prospect Theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 
2005). 
 
Principles to be considered by the change manager include the Asymmetry Principle 
(Slovic, 1993, in Slovic, 2000), the Reversed-Quandary Principle (Smith, 2005), and 
the Affect Principle (Smith, 2005). 
 
Normalisation of Deviance theory shows that breaches of known safety standards can 
cause deterioration of the standards when there is no negative impact of the breach.   
This was clearly demonstrated in the case of the Space Shuttle Challenger explosion 
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(Vaughan, 1996) and more locally in the Moura No. 2 Underground Mine explosion in 
1994 (Hopkins, 1999, Windridge, 1996). 
 
Social Construction of Risk theory demonstrates that risk is socially constructed and 
can therefore be socially engineered and controllable whilst the Expected Utility Theory 
and Cumulative Prospect Theory are both mathematical models for predicting 
behaviour of individuals. 
 
The Asymmetry Principle reminds the risk manager that winning trust is always an 
uphill battle and impacts on risk perception of individuals and groups (Slovic, 1993 in 
Slovic, 2000).   The Reversed Quandary Principle demonstrates that even 
professionals are susceptible to individual cultural forms of behaviour that may cause a 
conflict in risk perception studies, and should be considered by the risk manager 
(based on Barnes, 1995 and Slovic, 2000). 
 
The Affect Principle has been thus named due to the affect of a perceived risk-benefit 
in the mind of an individual and the subsequent implications in risk decision-making.  
(Smith, 2005).  A number of experts recognise that the affect of a psychological 
process, for example Zajonc (1980), Johnson and Tversky (1983) and Alhakami and 
Slovic (1994) all cited in Slovic (2000) has an impact upon an individual’s perception of 
risk.   That is, the greater the perceived benefit in the mind of an individual as it affects 
the individual, the lower the perceived risk.  The inverse rule also applies: The lower 
the perceived risk as it affects the individual, the greater the perceived benefit (Slovic, 
2000). 
 
 
Managing the Change 
 
 
Resolution Strategies 
 
 
An astute risk or change manager concerned with the furtherance of transport safety in 
Australia may benefit from utilising the lessons learned from previous cases as 
described in this paper.    
 
A limited number of factors that impact on the reception to change include: 
 
• Comprehensive and ongoing education campaigns  
• Community pressure for governments to take action 
• Community consultation processes  
 
These three factors are elaborated on: 
 
Education Campaigns 
 
Successful programs that have involved public education campaigns in Victoria have 
included the seat belt legislation, bicycle helmet campaign and nationally, the Civil 
Aviation Safety Regulation (CASR) 119 and 121A processes.   One common factor of 
all these successful programs has been the distinct lack of resistance. 
 
Comprehensive education campaigns contribute to successful risk communication and 
help to provide accurate information upon which individuals can make an informed 
decision and gain an accurate perception of the risk at hand, and its resolution 
strategies. 
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Community Pressure for Action 
 
 
Community pressure is generated when the public perceives a need for safety 
intervention.   The Victorian Road Toll in 1970 reached an unacceptably high level 
which caused public pressure on the government of the day to take action. 
 
The community pressure coupled with correct risk perceptions is a factor that reduces 
cultural resistance.   It can also be portrayed in the reverse view, that is, there was 
positive cultural resistance to ongoing lack of seatbelt legislation. 
 
Another situation that manifests elements of community pressure for action is the issue 
of smoking in the workplace.   Although not drawn from the transport safety sector, it is 
a health related issue and this example serves to illustrate a point none-the-less: 
 
Kotin and Gaul reported in 1980 that there was significant resistance to reducing the 
hazards of smoking in the workplace because “smoking has been an accepted element 
in Western culture for centuries” and a “hesitation to interfere with … personal 
freedom”, yet research since 1974 has shown that smoking causes harm to children, 
lung cancer, SIDS, heart disease, stroke, respiratory infection and many other ailments 
(National Drug Strategy, 2001). 
 
Australian studies show that resistance to anti-smoking legislation is decreasing, and 
has been measured by the National Drug Strategy attitude surveys between 1993 and 
1998.   Significant improvement has been demonstrated by the surveys of attitudes 
toward environmental tobacco smoke, and proponents of anti-smoking should be 
encouraged that the resistance is diminishing. 
 
 
Community Consultation Processes 
 
 
Project managers are well advised to include a consultation process in any significant 
proposal to implement new policy, procedures or legislation that are intended to 
improve transport safety. 
 
One of the best-prepared proposals to introduce legislation in the aviation industry in 
recent years is the CASR 119 legislation.   CASR 119 mandates the requirement for an 
air operator to have a safety management system in use.  The process adopted and 
followed by the regulator, CASA has particular application to this research, as the 
approach to the drafting and introduction of proposed legislation has followed an 
extensive consultation process. 
 
During the life of the project, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA, 2005(a)) has 
undertaken an extensive industry consultation process including air-operator 
workshops.   Over a 5 year period, CASA has conducted an ongoing Safety 
Management Survey which assesses and tracks the industry acceptance of the 
proposed legislation.   (CASA, 2005(b)). 
 
 
Further Research Possibilities 
 
 
Further research may enable quantitative measurement of culture (generally), safety 
culture and cultural resistance.    
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Further research may enable the application of known theory to transport safety 
initiatives to predict individual response and development of yet unknown theory to 
predict societal response to a transport safety initiative. 
 
There is potential for application of the utility theory and expected prospect theory to 
gains and losses in cross-modal transport safety, as well as the development of new 
theory to accurately measure the predisposition of society to resist implementation of 
transport safety initiatives.   Software modelling may have some application in this 
area. 
 
This paper contains results of only a limited range of case studies.   There are 
innumerable cases that potentially add knowledge to the case at hand, and other cases 
are worthy of investigation in light of changing cultural resistance to transport safety.    
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
This paper has demonstrated a need to measure culture and cultural resistance, with 
particular focus on improving transport safety.    
 
It has also highlighted some of the known theories and principles impacting upon 
cultural resistance, and has also named principles that may not previously have been 
considered in transport safety challenges.    
 
Impacting factors have been extracted from case studies and provided to help the risk 
manager plan the change process more efficiently. 
 
Cultural resistance has now been recognised as a detrimental contributor to transport 
safety, and so it is imperative that a change management process should be 
implemented.  
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